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Abstract 
A number of decisions need to be made when setting up a nutrient 
trading system including defining a target, allocating allowances and setting up a 
monitoring system. To ensure that the nutrient trading system implemented 
operates in harmony with existing regulation, existing work and institutions need 
to be used to guide this decision making process. This paper briefly explores each 
of the decisions required to implement a nutrient trading system and to what 
extent they have been addressed so far. This will provide context for following 
papers which will examine each issue in more depth.  
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Introduction 
Water quality has been declining in Lake Rotorua for at least the last 30 
years due to increased levels of nutrients entering the lake (PCE 2006). The increase 
in nutrient levels has led to increased frequency of algal blooms, which limit 
recreational water use and affect the local fish, plant and animal populations. 
Substantial effort has been undertaken to improve water quality through reducing the 
nutrient levels within the lake. Despite these efforts, the amount of nutrients entering 
the lake is still above sustainable levels and the costs of incremental improvements, 
and hence political resistance, are beginning to escalate. Therefore, new efforts are 
needed. One potential solution is the implementation of a nutrient trading system 
which, if designed well, would complement the existing policies. This paper will 
discuss the decisions that are needed to implement a nutrient trading system and how 
existing institutions, policies and research can be used as a basis for these decisions.1 
A number of groups have already been set up to manage the problem. The 
Joint Strategy Committee was set up in 2002 to coordinate the efforts of Environment 
Bay of Plenty (EBOP), Rotorua District Council (RDC) and Te Arawa Maori Trust 
and monitor the implementation of policies. A substantial amount of research has 
been carried out in this region. To evaluate and coordinate this research, two 
Technical Advisory Groups (TAGs) have been set up. One of these groups focuses on 
the lake dynamics and hydrological/water quality interface while the other focuses on 
best land management practices and land use change options. To represent and liaise 
with the local community, the Lakes Water Quality Society (LWQS), which initially 
focused on weed issues, has been set up. This group has organised a number of 
symposia to educate the public on water quality and nutrient loss issues and has 
prepared submissions to EBOP and RDC. 
In addition to the formation of these groups, a substantial amount of work 
has been carried out to actively reduce the level of nutrients entering the lake. For 
example, a sewerage reticulation system has significantly reduced the level of 
nutrients entering the lake from urban sources. Regulation has been implemented to 
prevent any increase in nutrient loss from non-urban areas. Under Rule 11, the 
nutrient loss from each property is benchmarked and prevented from increasing. Thus, 
                                                 
1 This paper builds on Kerr et al (2007).   2  
if a landowner wishes to change his land use or management practices in a way that 
will increase nutrient loss, he must offset this increase in other ways. He could, for 
example, create riparian boundaries. Programmes, such as those funded by the 
Sustainable Farming Fund (SFF), have focused on educating landowners and 
facilitating the adoption of technology to reduce nutrient loss.  
The current work to improve water quality in Lake Rotorua has already 
identified a goal in terms of water quality and nutrients entering the lake. Research 
and administrative infrastructure have been set up. These can be used to guide the 
decisions needed for setting up a nutrient trading system. 
A nutrient trading system would enable regulators to directly control the 
level of nutrients lost from the land and subsequently flowing into the lake. To 
implement such a system we need to do each of the following: 
•  Define goals 
•  Define tradable units: allowances  
•  Determine scope: who is included in the system; who is responsible for 
nutrient loss outside the system 
•  Set trading caps 
•  Allocate allowances to individual legal entities 
•  Monitor nutrient loss from each property and water quality 
•  Ensure that allowances are not exceeded 
•  Design a governance mechanism for adaptive management 
•  Source funding to operate system 
The success of a nutrient trading system depends on each of the above 
factors. Thus, each needs to be carefully considered prior to the implementation of the 
system. 
Building on existing efforts has two benefits. First, it ensures that work is 
not duplicated. Second, by utilising existing frameworks, the nutrient trading system 
that is developed will operate in harmony with other regulations. Many of the existing 
institutions and policies will be able to be used in either their current or a slightly 
modified form. However, in some cases, where the existing work is inappropriate or 
does not exist, new institutions and policies may need to be developed.    3  
This paper briefly addresses the issues listed above, and to what extent they 
have been addressed, in order to provide a context for more detailed work on each 
issue in later papers.  
 
Identifying the Goal 
The water quality goal needs to balance the benefits of improved water 
quality to the local and wider community, against the costs of achieving it. 
Consequently, efforts are likely to be made to improve the water quality but not in a 
manner which cripples the local economy. The decision regarding the water quality 
goal needs to be made using a combination of cost benefit analysis and political 
processes. This goal needs to be defined in terms of things people care about directly 
such as water clarity or the probability of algal blooms.  
Water quality depends on the level of nutrients in the lake. Once the water 
quality goal has been identified, it needs to be related to the level of nutrients in the 
lake because these can be measured, and more directly controlled, while having a 
strong relationship to the outcome in which we are really interested. We can identify 
the level of nutrients in the lake which will allow the water quality goal to be met, at 
least on average. From a management point of view, it may be more useful to know 
what level of nutrients flowing into the lake will allow the water quality goal to be 
met. Thus, the water quality goal may need to be expressed in two ways: the level of 
nutrients in the lake and the amount of nutrients able to flow into the lake. The 
difference between the ‘stock’ of nutrients and the flow depends on the residence time 
of the nutrients in the lake.    4  
 
Setting the Cap 
Once the goal is expressed in terms of nutrients, we can determine the 
amount of manageable nutrients able to enter the lake, or the cap (Figure 1). The goal 
provides a measure of the amount of nutrients able to enter the lake from all sources. 
However, some of these nutrients are going to be from ‘unmanageable’ sources and 
these will not be affected by any policy introduced now. This includes nutrients 
entering the lake from the sediment and nutrients that are already in the groundwater 
system.
2 Thus, to manage the nutrients entering the lake, we need to identify the 
amount of nutrients entering the lake from manageable sources. To do this, we need to 
realistically estimate the level of unmanageable flows. By subtracting the 
unmanageable nutrients from the level of nutrients defined in the goal, we can identify 






                                                 
2 Some of the nutrients entering the system from “unmanageable” sources can be mitigated through the 
use of flocculants for example. However, this mitigation is not an optimal long term strategy for 
addressing the problem of nutrients entering the lake.  
Water quality in Lake Rotorua is monitored using a number of different
measures. The water quality goal that has been identified is defined using a summary
measure, the trophic level index (TLI). The target TLI for the lake is set at 4.2 TLI but
currently water quality in Lake Rotorua is 5.0 TLI. This goal has also been defined in
terms of the amount of nutrients that are able to flow into the lake. Research has
suggested that the water quality goal can be achieved with 435 tonnes of Nitrogen and
35 tonnes of Phosphorus entering the lake each year, if the lake is in equilibrium. These
could be used as the basis for the nutrient trading system, but identified sustainable
nutrient flows are currently being exceeded. 






Figure 1. The relationship between the goal, cap and trading cap for nutrients entering Lake 
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The level at which the cap is set determines the environmental effect of the 
system. If the cap is set too high, more nutrients will flow into the lake than the lake is 
able to support and the water quality goal will not be achieved. 
   6  
 
Scope of the Trading System 
A nutrient trading system is only one way of managing nutrient flow into 
the lake and may not be appropriate for all sources of nutrient loss. Thus, some 
sources may not be included in a nutrient trading system. For example, it may be more 
Estimates are available on the amount of nutrients entering the lake from various 
sources (Table 1). Estimates of the future flows of nutrients that are already in 
groundwater are also available. Combining these we are able to estimate the 
manageable and unmanageable nutrient flows into the lake.  
 
Table 1. Lake Rotorua’s nutrient inflows using land use nutrient export coefficients  
















Native forest & 
scrub 
10,588  4  42.1 5.4  0.12  1.31 3.3 
Exotic  forest  9,463  3  28.4 3.6  0.10  0.95 2.4 
Cropping & 
horticulture 
282  60  16.9 2.2  2.00  0.56 1.4 
Pasture  20,112    563.0 71.9  0.84  16.93 42.5 
• Beef  1,196 35  41.9  5.3  0.9 1.08 2.72 
•  Sheep  28 16  0.5  0.1  1.0 0.03  0.085 
• Sheep & 
beef 




• Deer  418 15  6.3  0.8  0.9 0.38  0.935 
• Deer/sheep/
beef 




• Dairy  5,883 50  294.1  37.5  0.7 4.12  10.3275 
• Grassland  425 12  5.1  0.6  0.9 0.38  0.935 
• Other  628 12  7.5  0.9  0.9 0.57  1.445 
Lifestyle 556  20  11.1 1.4  0.90  0.50 1.3 
Urban   3,267    50.1 6.4  1.17  3.82 9.6 
• Sewage     28.0  3.6   1.00  2.5 
• Septic tanks     12.0  1.5   0.53  1.3 
• Stormwater     10.1  1.3   2.29  5.8 
Springs           13.00  32.7 
Geothermal      42.2 5.4    1.40 3.5 
Waterfowl
1     1.4 0.2    0.80 2.0 




52,347    783.1 100 0.76 39.80 100 
1 The nutrient inputs from waterfowl grazing will vary considerably from year to year as numbers of birds in the 
catchment fluctuate. In terms of “strict” nutrient budgeting, most of the nutrient inputs are termed “recycling” when 
the waterfowl eat lake plants. The waterfowl figures are included in this table for comparison only, and are not 
included in the total tonnages or percentages. 
Source: Table 6, Draft Lakes Rotorua and Rotoiti Action Plan.    7  
appropriate for the nutrient loss from urban areas to be controlled under separate 
regulations.  
New Zealand’s fisheries management policy provides one example of a 
system where only some groups are included in the trading system, but where total 
harvest is controlled. Many New Zealand fisheries are harvested by three different 
sectors: customary, recreational and commercial. Only commercial fishermen are 
regulated under a tradable quota system, the Quota Management System (QMS). Prior 
to the start of the fishing season, the total allowable harvest for each species is set. 
Estimates of the current harvest levels by customary and recreational fishermen are 
calculated. Then, customary fishers are allocated a proportion of the allowable harvest 
that is large enough to cover their fishing entitlements. The remainder of the 
allowable harvest is then split between recreational and commercial fishermen. The 
allocation given to the commercial sector forms the trading cap required for the QMS. 
Thus, excluding some sources from the trading system does not need to compromise 
the ability of the system to achieve its goals.  
 
Setting the Trading Cap 
Once the scope of the trading system is identified, the trading cap can be 
determined. To do this, the nutrient loss from the sources outside of the trading 
system needs to be estimated. The remainder of the cap once the sources outside the 
trading system have been subtracted equals the trading cap.  
The trading cap must be expressed in a way that can be allocated to and 
monitored at the individual property level. This allows regulators to ensure that 
individuals are not exceeding their nutrient allowances.  
The current regulations provide some potential guidelines for determining the 
scope of the system. Under Rule 11, the nutrient loss from all rural properties is
benchmarked. Rural landowners are also restricted from making land use or
management decisions that will increase the nutrient loss without mitigating the
increase in nutrient loss. This rule excludes urban land uses. The nutrient trading system
could follow this and exclude urban land uses. This would mean that the nutrient loss
from urban land would need to be managed separately.    8  
Allocation of Allowances 
One of the most politically difficult decisions when setting up a trading 
scheme is the initial allocation of the allowances. The allocation method used will not 
have any environmental effects. There are also no efficiency effects if the trading 
system works well. But there are large distributional effects associated with the 
allocation mechanism chosen. Once nutrient loss is limited, the resources devoted to 
controlling nutrient loss will rise and the allowances will become increasingly 
valuable. Those who must control nutrients will face high costs and those who are 
allocated allowances for free will receive something of high value. This makes it 
important to identify an acceptable mechanism for allocating allowances.  
 
Monitoring Nutrient Loss 
Once a cap has been put in place and allowances have been allocated, 
monitoring is required to ensure that allowance holdings are not exceeded. 
Landowners are going to have an incentive to exceed their allowances if a binding cap 
Through the benchmarking process carried out for Rule 11, we will obtain an
estimate of current nutrient loss from all non-urban land uses. This benchmark could
provide data for the allocation process. But as this data was not collected for allocation
purposes, there may be resistance to its use in an allocation process. In any case, should
we allocate allowances based in any way on current nutrient loss? This could reward
landowners who currently lose a large amount of nutrients off their property and punish
those who have taken steps to reduce nutrient loss. One alternative could be to allocate
allowances based on long-term land use possibilities, but this may mean that some
landowners would not receive sufficient allowances to cover their current nutrient loss.
Rule 11 also creates a precedent that landowners may not increase their nutrient loss
relative to today’s level without offsetting that increase. 
There is another precedent in the system for who pays for nutrient reductions.
To date, the costs of reducing nutrients entering the lake are largely being borne by rate
and tax payers through RDC, EBOP and MfE.   9  
is placed on the system restricting nutrient loss. If all nutrient loss is covered by 
allowances, the cap will be met.  
In an ideal system, we would like to directly monitor the nutrients lost from 
all properties and their impact on the lake but in reality this is not possible. Instead, 
we need to design a way to assess nutrient loss from each property and the 
relationship between nutrient loss and nutrient import into the lake and, hence, a way 
of relating the nutrient loss to the allowances needed. To achieve this, we need 
information on land use, management practices and location within the catchment, a 
model of nutrient loss and models of attenuation and groundwater lags (these may be 
combined). In addition to being able to model nutrient loss, we need to ensure that the 
information supplied for this model is accurate as landowners may choose to under-
report their nutrient loss once the system is in place. 
Under Rule 11, a nutrient leaching model, NPLAS, is used to calculate the
nutrient loss from each property based on land use and management practices. This
programme will be available to landowners to assist them with decision making in the
future. A trial version is currently available on the web and an updated version of the
model will be available shortly. Allowing landowners access to a model that predicts
their nutrient run-off would enable them to calculate the nutrient remedial measure they
would need to offset any increase in run-off resulting from changes in land use or
management. Other models for attenuation and groundwater lags are also available. 
The information feeding into the model must be verified and methods have
been developed to verify data provided for Rule 11 benchmarking. Random audits are
being used to deter landowners from misreporting nutrient loss. In addition to random
audits, further investigations are carried out when reported data seems suspicious. For
instance, satellite images and aerial photography are used to identify land use and
information from the consent process is used to check management information
provided by landowners. For example, consents provide information on the amount of
dairy effluent from the property, which can be used to make inferences about animal
numbers. Thus, by combining the land use and animal data, we obtain insight into
whether a property is accurately reporting its nutrient run-off information.    10  
Enforcement of Cap 
To ensure that individuals do not exceed their allowances, enforcement 
mechanisms must be in place. A well-designed enforcement mechanism would reduce 
the likelihood of the trading cap being exceeded. If the monitoring and/or verification 
process reveals that an individual has exceeded their allowances, a penalty must be in 
place. Various options are available including requiring the individual to purchase 
enough allowances, fines and directly limiting future land use and management 
options. 
If the nutrient loss was greater than expected, and consequently the 
allowances held by landowners were insufficient to cover losses, individuals could be 
forced to purchase extra allowances from the market. This could be expensive, and 
possibly infeasible, if there were limited allowances on the market. But if feasible, 
this method would ensure that the trading cap was not exceeded. Alternatively, 
individuals could be fined for exceeding their allowances. Unlike a requirement to 
hold allowances, using an enforcement mechanism such as a fine would have an 
environmental impact. Since the offending individuals would be exceeding their 
allowances without purchasing additional allowances, the trading cap would be 
exceeded, thus worsening water quality. 
Enforcement mechanisms that limit use in a nutrient trading system need to 
be designed slightly differently to those used in an extractive tradable allowance 
system such as fisheries. In a fisheries system, once the cap has been reached, 
fishermen are prevented from harvesting any more catch until the following fishery 
season. But in a nutrient trading system, if the nutrients lost off the property reach the 
annual limit before the end of the year, it is not possible to prevent additional loss. 
Thus, if the regulator were to penalise individuals by preventing further nutrient loss, 
this would need to be through a reduction in future allowances or forcing the 
individual to reduce nutrient loss in the future. Because Regional Councils will run 
nutrient trading systems in New Zealand, the legal options for enforcement (and other 
issues) may differ from those available for a national programme run by Central 
government.   11  
Under Rule 11, the nutrient loss from individual properties cannot be
increased. Nutrient loss from each property is embodied in the resource consent. Thus,
if the landowner exceeds their nutrient loss benchmark, they would be violating their
resource consent and could be taken to court.  
 
Governance mechanism: adaptive management 
Any nutrient trading system that is designed for current conditions and with 
existing information will quickly become outdated as new scientific and economic 
information becomes available and social and political priorities change. For example, 
as new mitigation methods become available, the model for determining nutrient loss 
needs to be updated to ensure it remains as accurate as possible and provides the 
correct incentives for landowners.  
Prior to introduction, the institution(s) responsible for managing the 
evolution of the system needs to be identified. Continued research will need to be 
carried out. Thus, a process for identifying the relevant research is needed. As 
research findings may lead to changes in the system, it needs to be clear what areas of 
the system can be changed and through what governance process. Any updating of the 
system needs to be carried out in a manner which incorporates new information and 
political decisions effectively without introducing unnecessary uncertainty.  
The draft Action Plan created for improving the water quality in Lake
Rotorua has a series of reviews scheduled. This will enable the report to be updated in
the future. Nutrient reduction targets for land use are to be reviewed 3 years after the
Action Plan is operative and the entire report will be reviewed after 10 years. But while
this plan outlines time periods for revising the targets, it does not provide insight as to
how this might be done. To provide certainty for landowners, a clear method of
updating the system needs to be identified.  
The governance of water quality work for Lake Rotorua is being carried out
by a number of institutions. These include the Joint Strategy Committee, Environment
Bay of Plenty, Rotorua District Council and the Technical Advisory Groups. These
same institutions could be used to manage a nutrient trading system.    12  
Funding the Operation of the System 
Before a nutrient trading system can be implemented, the funding sources 
for the expenses associated with its operation need to be identified. The 
implementation and running of a nutrient trading system can be costly and have three 
distinct components. First, there are one-off costs associated with setting up the 
system including the trading mechanism. Second, there are on-going costs associated 
with the administration and monitoring of the system. Finally, there are on-going 
costs to continue research and carry out adaptive management to ensure that the 
system remains relevant and evolves in response to changes in knowledge and 
preferences. The funder(s) of each of these components needs to be identified prior to 
the implementation of the system. 
Currently, work on water quality in the Rotorua Lakes is funded by a variety of
sources at both local and central government levels. Environment Bay of Plenty, Rotorua
District Council, the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry and the Ministry for the
Environment are all funding policy development regarding water quality in Lake Rotorua.
Since the nutrient trading system is not currently in place, no organisation is funding its
maintenance or the associated monitoring. But Rule 11 work is funded by Environment
Bay of Plenty. On-going research costs are being borne by Environment Bay of Plenty,
the Sustainable Farming Fund and the Foundation for Research, Science and Technology.
Should these same organisations fund a nutrient trading system? 
While these organisations may be potential funding sources for a nutrient
trading scheme, stakeholders may also be a source of funding. In the Quota Management
System developed to manage New Zealand’s fisheries, the commercial fishing industry
pays for all costs attributable to commercial fishing. The system is set up in this way so
that those who benefit from the system (i.e. the fishermen) fund its maintenance and the
research associated with it. Thus, the costs of the system are internalised. Should those
who benefit from the improved water quality associated with the nutrient trading system
fund the system’s maintenance and the research associated with it? If so, which groups
benefit? Tourists? Residents? Exporters who benefit from New Zealand’s clean green
image? Fishermen? This will ideally be decided prior to the system’s introduction.   13  
Conclusion 
A number of institutions and regulations are already in place to improve 
water quality in Lake Rotorua. When setting up a nutrient trading system, we can use 
institutions, policies and research already developed as a basis for the trading system. 
But a trading system has many components and it is not possible to base all of these 
on current institutions and policies. In some cases, the institutions and processes in 
place are not relevant for a nutrient trading system. In other cases, institutions and 
processes required for a nutrient trading system are unnecessary under current 
regulations. But by working from existing policy, we are able to create a more 
harmonious system for managing water quality and preventing duplication of work. 
This is the first in a series of background papers. Future papers will address each of 
the components in a nutrient trading system in more detail.  
   14  
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